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REGULATION IN PERSPECTIVE: HISTORICAL ESSAYS. Edited by 
Thomas K McCraw. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 
1981. Pp. ix, 246. $17.95. 
Regulation in Perspective: Historical Essays presents a collection of five 
essays, originally presented at a Harvard Business School Conference. The 
contributors focus on the history of regulation, generally avoiding economic 
analysis. Instead, the authors - four historians and a political scientist -
describe American regulatory schemes as a function of the society in which 
they arose. This results in some interesting commentary from some rela-
tively uncommon analytic perspectives. 
Each author begins by closely examining a particular phase of economic 
regulation. The subjects range from the regulations of various industries 
prior to the New Deal to the independent role of regulatory agencies in the 
structure of American government. Historical episodes are compared and 
contrasted throughout, with the aim of understanding the past and predict-
ing, as well as guiding, the future. The central theme uniting the contribu-
tions is a common concern for the felt need which inspired different 
regulatory enterprises. While those needs varied greatly across time and 
across industries, the contributors agree with Morton Keller's assertion in 
the second essay that a nation's regulatory system reflects its history and the 
development of its society. As Gerald Berk notes in his concluding essay, 
the history of regulation "is, in large part, a history of how people thought 
about and debated the nature of the market, economic efficiency, business 
social responsibility, and acceptable levels of health and environmental risk 
in industrial society" (p. 187). 
The authors, of course, go beyond the somewhat unsurprising conclu-
sion that public ideology has shaped the regulatory environment. One of 
the most interesting aspects of the book is the contributors' analyses of the 
role of economic as opposed to other influences in the formation of the 
public attitudes governing the scope of regulation. For example, Thomas 
Mccraw challenges the primacy of economic efficiency in the original un-
derstanding of antitrust legislation. At least some early reformers, notably 
Brandeis, supported trade regulation because of political and social, rather 
than economic, considerations. McCraw translates the antitrust debate of 
the early twentieth century into the contemporary vocabulary of industrial 
concentration economics, 1 and concludes that Brandeis rested his support 
for regulation on other grounds. For ideological reasons derived from the 
progressive movement, Brandeis perceived the antitrust issue as an oppor-
tunity to maximize the absolute number of business units in the economy, 
despite whatever welfare losses might be imposed by foregone economies of 
scale.2 
While a credible development of Brandeis' views, McCraw's analysis 
1. Much ofMcCraw's analysis relies on the distinction between center firms and peripheral 
firms and the theory of the dual economy. See generally R. AVERITT, THE DUAL ECONOMY: 
THE DYNAMICS OF AMERICAN INDUSTRY STRUCTURE (1968). 
2. McCraw, of course, is not the first to suggest that some of the goals of the Sherman Act 
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bears little relation to current antitrust law. Not only is there little support 
for the conclusion that more pivotal reformers such as Senator Sherman 
based their beliefs on political rather than economic concems,3 but congres-
sional inaction has long since placed an imprimatur of approval on the eco-
nomic approach.4 Moreover, especially with respect to a statute as facially 
obscure as the Sherman Act, speculations regarding the motives of its au-
thors can hardly be conclusive. Indeed, Mccraw if anything seems reluc-
tant to exalt the political over the efficiency rationale for trade regulation, 
as evidenced in his discussion of Brandeis' support for exempting small 
businesses from price-fixing prohibitions (pp. 49-50). Nevertheless, Mc-
Craw asserts that the American experience with antitrust regulation evi-
dences "a powerful disinclination to persist in hard economic analysis that 
may lead away from strong ideological preferences" (pp. 54-55). Perhaps, 
but contemporary antitrust policy is the domain of technocrats, not reform-
ers. The closest thing to ideology in the regulation of industrial concentra-
tion is almost surely the wealth-maximization of Posner and his disciples.5 
Ifso, the implicit distinction between political (or intellectual) ideology and 
economic analysis may be limited to an historical observation. 
Another theme uniting the various contributions to Regulation in Per-
spective is America's historical ambivalence between corporate power on 
the one hand and governmental power on the other. While scarcely an 
original insight,6 this ideal leads to some interesting commentary by Mor-
ton Keller. Keller convincingly suggests that this ambivalence has fostered 
a highly complex regulatory system, one which reconciles one of the world's 
most extensive regulatory networks with one of its freest economies, and 
one of the strictest antitrust policies with one of the highest levels of merger 
activity. 
Generalizing from history, the authors also look to recent changes in 
American regulation. These changes, suggests David Vogel, include shift-
ing ideologies, heightened concern for social issues, and more intense polit-
ical debate about the intrusiveness of federal regulation and its costs to the 
private sector. But Vogel also points out the rise of administrative agencies 
as independent sources of public policy, illustrating his assertions with ex-
amples drawn from recent environmental and consumer-protection 
legislation. 
were inconsistent with consumer welfare maximization. See generally Bork, Legislative Intent 
and the Policy of the Sherman Act, 9 J.L. & EcoN. 7 (1966). 
3. See Weaver,Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice, in THE POLITICS OF REOU• 
LATION 130 (J. Wilson ed. 1980). 
4. At least since United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 
1953), ajfd. per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954), the courts have viewed the antitrust laws primarily 
as guardians of economic efficiency. The congressional failure to repudiate the economic ap-
proach arguably constitutes approval of the statutory interpretation. See, e.g., Merrill Lynch, 
Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Curran, 102 S. Ct. 1825, 1841 (1982); Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 
575, 580-81 (1978). 
5. See R. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW (1976). Posner has since ranged far from industrial 
market structure in developing his ethical system of ''wealth maximization." See, e.g., R. Pos-
NER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE (1981). 
6. See E. HAWLEY, THE NEW DEAL AND THE PROBLEM OF MONOPOLY: A STUDY IN Eco-
NOMIC AMBIVALENCE 472-73 (1966). 
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The authors' greatest contribution is locating regulation in its historical 
context. Too often, regulation is described as an autonomous phenomenon, 
not a human institution. Instead, as the authors make clear in the several 
contexts they have chosen and in the themes they sound in common, public 
ideology gave rise to regulation and in large part explains its current forms. 
As James Q. Wilson has remarked concerning the development of regula-
tion, "we must be struck at every tum by the importance of ideas."7 It 
follows that those who would understand - or influence - the future of 
regulation must attend to the public attitudes that have called forth the ad-
ministrative arm of modem govemment.8 
7. Wilson, The Politics of Regulation, in THE POLITICS OF REGULATION 393 (J. Wilson ed. 
1980). 
8. Regulation in Perspective is also reviewed by Ritchie, Book Review, 56 Bus. HIST. Rev. 
87 (1982). 
